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THE PECULIAR RISK DOCTRINE: HIGH RISE
BENEFITS FOR CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION
WORKERS
I. INTRODUCTION
When a California construction worker falls from a scaffold, or
heavy equipment crushes him or the trench he is digging collapses on
him, an avenue of recovery closed to most other employees opens to him:
a "third party" suit under the "peculiar risk" doctrine.
Employees injured on the job generally are limited to workers' com-
pensation awards for injuries incurred during the scope of employment.1
The workers' compensation system developed as a trade-off of employer
and employee rights under the common law of torts. Employers ac-
cepted no fault liability and gave up various defenses that would bar tort
recovery by their employees. In return, employees gave up on the right
to litigate the issue of employer fault, with potentially greater verdicts,
for the smaller but certain workers' compensation benefits, including pro-
vision of immediate medical care and regulation of workplace safety.2
Only a few statutory exceptions to California workers' compensation
laws permit an employee to directly sue his employer.'
1. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971) provides that workers' compensation is the ex-
clusive remedy against employers for injuries sustained by their employees arising out of and in
the course of employment.
2. The nation's first workers' compensation system was established in New York in 1910.
Although initially overturned as an invalid exercise of the state's police powers in Ives v. South
Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), the statute was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916), following an
amendment to New York's constitution.
California's workers' compensation system was enacted in 1937 by constitutional amend-
ment. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 now provides that:
A complete system of workers' compensation includes adequate provisions for the
comfort, health and safety and general welfare of any and all workers and those
dependent upon them for support to the extent of relieving from the consequences of
any injury or death incurred or sustained by workers in the course of their employ-
ment, irrespective of the fault of any party; also full provision for securing safety in
places of employment; full provision for such medical, surgical, hospital and other
remedial treatment as is requisite to cure and relieve from the effects of such injury;
full provision for adequate insurance coverage against liability to pay or furnish com-
pensation ....
3. Limited exceptions exist where an employer is uninsured, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3706
(West 1971 & Supp. 1985) (civil suit permitted); where an employer willfully assaults an em-
ployee, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(1) (West 1971 & Supp. 1986) (civil suit permitted); where
an employee's injury is aggravated by the employer's fraudulent concealment of the existence
of the injury and its connection to the job, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(2) (West 1971 & Supp.
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In the construction industry, in particular, a worker's ability to sue
a third party for injuries incurred on the job greatly multiplies potential
recovery for on-the-job injuries.4  A construction worker is often em-
ployed by a subcontractor of the general contractor, who in turn works
under a contract with the landowner who is developing the construction
project. Although the worker may be unable to sue the subcontractor
who hired him, there are several potential "third party" defendants in a
lawsuit: other subcontractors, the general contractor and the land-
owner.5 Furthermore, a number of common law theories of liability exist
against landowners and general contractors. Landowners have common
law duties to invitees on their land,6 including workers. The common
law also imposes duties on landowners in the selection,7 direction' and
supervision of contractors.9 Both landowners and general contractors
can be held liable where they retain control over work at a construction
site.1 These common law rules are often sufficient to permit an injured
construction worker to recover in tort against third parties.
Another duty adds significantly to the possible bases of tort liability
of landowners and general contractors: the Restatement of Torts "pecu-
1986) (civil suit permitted for aggravation of disease only); where an employee's injury or
death results from a product manufactured by his employer, but transferred to a third party
who provides the product for the employee's use, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(3) (West 1971 &
Supp. 1986) (civil suit permitted); where an employee can successfully allege a "serious and
willful" violation of safety standards, CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986)
(workers' compensation award increased); and where an employer removes or fails to install
power press operation guards, CAL. LAB. CODE § 4558 (West Supp. 1986) (civil suit
permitted).
4. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986) provides that workers may pursue
actions against third parties responsible for their injuries.
5. Where expressly provided by contract, these parties often cross-complain against the
employee's own subcontractor-employer for indemnity. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3864 (West 1971)
forbids an action for implied indemnity in the absence of a written agreement. See, e.g., Her-
mann Christensen & Sons, Inc. v. Paris Plastering Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 237, 132 Cal. Rptr. 86
(1976) (subcontractor which obligated itself to indemnify general contractor for "any and all
claims, suits or liability for... injuries to persons" required to indemnify general contractor
for damages paid to subcontractor's own employee for his work injuries).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965).
7. Id. § 411. See, e.g., Holman v. State, 53 Cal. App. 3d 317, 124 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1975)
(employee injured by fall into unguarded equipment supplied by his employer permitted to sue
job developer for negligent selection of contractor).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 410 (1965). See Mackey v. Campbell Constr.
Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 774, 162 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1980); see infra notes 230-35 and accompanying
text.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 412 (1965).
10. Id. § 414. See, e.g., Mackey v. Campbell Constr. Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 774, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 64 (1980); see infra notes 230-35 and accompanying text; Kramer v. Cedu Found., Inc.,
93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979); see infra notes 258-60.
PECULIAR RISK DOCTRINE
liar risk" doctrine. 1' Courts originally developed this doctrine to protect
third persons outside an owner's land who were injured by activities on
the land.12 The doctrine provides that landowners, as "employers" 3 of
contractors, have a nondelegable duty to ensure that safety precautions
are taken where work is of a nature which foreseeably creates a "peculiar
unreasonable risk of harm to others unless special precautions are
taken."1 4 Even when a landowner contractually requires the general
contractor to take necessary precautions, the landowner may still be held
vicariously liable for the general contractor's failure to take those precau-
tions.1" Similarly, a general contractor, as the employer of subcontrac-
tors, is subject to the nondelegable duty and vicarious liability of the
peculiar risk doctrine.
16
The peculiar risk doctrine provides a particularly broad basis for
third party liability in California. Most jurisdictions in the United States
have held that the rule does not pertain to employees because their inju-
11. The "peculiar risk" doctrine derives its name from the language of the Restatement:
"work... likely to create... apeculiar unreasonable risk...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS 413 (1965) (emphasis added). See also id § 416 ("work ... likely to create ... a
peculiar risk"). The California Supreme Court suggested that the doctrine would be better
labeled "special risk," adopting language taken from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 413 comment b (1965): "'."Peculiar" does not mean that the risk must be one which is
abnormal to the type of work done, or that it must be an abnormally great risk. It has refer-
ence only to a special, recognizable danger arising out of the work itself."' Aceves v. Regal
Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 509, 595 P.2d 619, 622, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44 (1979) (em-
phasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comment b (1965)). See
Booth, Passive Third Party Liability, 45 L.A. B. BULL. 372 (1970), for a discussion of the
peculiar or "special risks" doctrine in California.
12. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
13. Landowners or general contractors who employ independent contractors will be re-
ferred to in this Comment as "owner-employers," although they are referred to in the Restate-
ment as "employers." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 15 (1965). See infra note 14
for an example of the Restatement's grouping of landowners and general contractors into the
single term, "employer."
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (1965) states:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should
recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of phys-
ical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precau-
tions, or
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the
taking of such precautions.
Id. (emphasis added).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965), states that employers are liable for
physical harm caused by "the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such
precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or
otherwise."
16. See supra note 14.
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ries are covered by workers' compensation laws. 7 However, since 1962,
California has taken the minority position that employees are covered by
the peculiar risk doctrine.18 Employer-owners who hire independent
contractors have been held liable to workers for the negligence of the
workers' subcontractor-employers, 9 and even for the negligence of the
workers themselves under the concept of comparative negligence.20
The California Supreme Court's interpretation of the peculiar risk
doctrine has led to its application in many more situations than originally
contemplated by the drafters of the Restatement doctrine.2" The doctrine
has been applied to almost every common construction site activity, in-
cluding backing-up large trucks,22 moving heavy objects,23 working at
heights,24 working on bridges,25 working from scaffolds,26 working in
trenches27 and working pursuant to an unsafe plan.28 Not surprisingly,
some California lower courts have balked at this expansive interpreta-
tion, which imposes a nondelegable duty to ensure workers' safety for
often ordinary construction risks that do not rise to the level of liability
under the doctrines of inherent danger,29 grave risk3 or strict liability
17. A minority of jurisdictions have held that the peculiar risk doctrine is applicable to
employees: District of Columbia (Lindler v. District, 164 U.S. App. D.C. 35, 38-40, 502 F.2d
495, 498-500 (1974)); Iowa (Giarratano v. Weitz Co., 259 Iowa 1292, 1306-08, 147 N.W.2d
824, 833-34 (1967)); Missouri (Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 112-
18, 6 S.W.2d 617, 624-27 (1928)); South Dakota (Hagberg v. City of Sioux Falls, 281 F. Supp.
460, 466-68 (D.S.D. 1968)); Tennessee (International Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn. App.
425, 449-57, 222 S.W.2d 854, 865-68 (1948)).
18. In Woolen v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 57 Cal. 2d 407, 369 P.2d 708, 20 Cal. Rptr. 12
(1962), the California Supreme Court decided that the "others" referred to in § 413 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), see supra note 14 for text, included injured work-
ers employed by the independent contractors. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Woolen.
19. See, eg., LaCount v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 754, 145 Cal. Rptr.
244 (1978) (subcontractor who employed plaintiff misjudged weight of concrete girders; excess
weight caused girders to fall while being hoisted, striking plaintiff).
20. See infra notes 244-60 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 94-201 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 202-21 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 229-37 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 423 (1965) states:
One who carries on an activity which threatens a grave risk of serious bodily harm or
death unless the instrumentalities used are carefully constructed and maintained, and
who employs an independent contractor to construct or maintain such instrumentali-
ties, is subject to the same liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the
1498
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activities."1 The result is that the peculiar risk doctrine has assumed im-
portance far beyond its origins; the doctrine acts to exempt construction
workers from workers' compensation limitations, while the workers' sub-
contractor-employers, and ultimately, those who engage the subcontrac-
tors, must nevertheless contribute to the workers' compensation system.
Whether an activity leading to a particular accident gives rise to the
heightened duty under the peculiar risk doctrine is a question of fact.32
However, the question may be taken from the jury," or the jury's verdict
may be set aside,14 if a particular court believes that the doctrine must be
strictly construed when applied to a work-related injury,35 or that a work
situation is not a peculiar risk "as a matter of law."
36
Does the severity of the injuries construction workers often incur37
contractor in constructing or maintaining such instrumentalities as though the em-
ployer had himself done the work of construction or maintenance.
See, e.g., Ramsey v. Marutamaya Ogatsu Fireworks Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 516, 140 Cal. Rptr.
247 (1977) (operators of fireworks display successfully sued sponsors for injuries sustained
when shells exploded before leaving the ground).
31. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 427A, 519-24 (1965).
32. See Mackey v. Campbell Constr. Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 774, 162 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1980).
"[W]hether the work is likely to create a peculiar risk ... is ordinarily a question to be resolved
by the trier of fact." Id. at 785, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 64. See also BAR APPROVED JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS 13.21, 13.21.4 (7th ed. 1986).
BAR APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 13.21.4 defines peculiar risk as follows:
The term ["peculiar risk"] ["special risk"] of bodily harm is a risk:
1. Which is peculiar to the work to be done,
2. Which arises out of the character of the work or the place where the work is
to be done, and
3. Against which a reasonable person with the knowledge and experience of
the defendant would recognize the necessity of taking special precautions.
The term ["peculiar risk"] ["special risk"] does not mean that the risk must be
one which is abnormal to the type of work done, or that it must be an abnormally
great risk. It has reference only to a special, recognizable danger arising out of the
work to be done.
33. See, e.g., Henderson Bros. Stores v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875
(1981) (nonsuit reversed); Elder v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 650, 136 Cal. Rptr.
203 (1977) (nonsuit upheld).
34. See, eg., Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaffolds, 57 Cal. 2d 651, 371 P.2d 311, 21 Cal. Rptr.
575 (1962) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict reversed); Castro v. State, 114 Cal. App. 3d
503, 170 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1981) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict reversed).
35. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Anderson v. Chancellor W. Oil Dev. Corp., 53 Cal. App. 3d 235, 243, 125
Cal. Rptr. 640, 645 (1975) ("[T]he use of a scaffold ... does not constitute... [a] peculiar
activity.. . ."). See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
37. In Widman v. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc., 19 Cal. App. 3d 734, 747, 97 Cal. Rptr. 52,
59 (1971), the court stated: "It is common knowledge that workmen injured or killed in con-
struction work do not receive full compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for
damages that they sustain, notwithstanding the commendable purpose of such legislation."
See generally, Philo, Revoke the Legal License to Kill Construction Workers, 19 DE PAUL L.
REV. 1 (1969).
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justify a tort recovery, or does the peculiar risk avenue remain, as some
courts have called it, a needless "windfall" circumventing the workers'
compensation laws?38
This Comment explores the policies which led to the peculiar risk
exception, and to its expanded application in California to distribute risk
among owner-employers, contractors and employees in a dangerous in-
dustry. This Comment also reviews the doctrine's applicability in partic-
ular work activities and describes how it is currently applied. Finally,
this Comment proposes a method by which the peculiar risk doctrine can
be applied consistently, both in terms of the workers' compensation
scheme and within construction employment situations.
II. HISTORY AND POLICY
A. Liability Under the Entrepreneur Theory v. Enterprise Theory
The peculiar risk doctrine is best understood by examining the de-
velopment of employers' common law vicarious liability for torts com-
mitted by their independent contractors.
The general rule that employers are not liable for the torts of their
independent contractors39 developed in England' and the United
States41 in the nineteenth century. It represented a retreat from the ear-
lier rule42 which held employers liable for nearly all of their servants'
torts under respondeat superior.3 Determination of whether the em-
38. West v. Guy F. Atkinson Constr. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 296, 301, 59 Cal. Rptr. 286,
289 (1967). In West, the court asked, "[w]hy should the employee of the independent contrac-
tor recover benefits greater than the employee of the general contractor? True, case law has
made him the beneficiary of a windfall and the owner-general contractor the insurer of pay-
ment of that windfall in the 'nondelegable liability' cases." Id. at 301, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965).
40. In Bush v. Steinman, 126 Eng. Rep. 978 (1799), the court held a homeowner liable for
injuries to the plaintiff and his wife resulting when their carriage overturned due to lime in the
road in front of the home. The defendant had contracted with a surveyor to repair his house.
The surveyor in turn hired a bricklayer whose servant placed the lime in the road.
Later British decisions retreated to the position of employer nonliability. See, e.g.,
Laugher v. Pointer, 108 Eng. Rep. 204 (1826) (employer not liable for negligence of hired
driver; liability for injury resulting from hired property distinguished from liability for injury
resulting from use of real estate).
41. Early cases held employers liable, following Bush v. Steinman, 126 Eng. Rep. 978
(1799). See Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24 (1849); Stone v. Cheshire
R.R., 19 N.H. 427 (1839). Later decisions held employers not liable. See, e.g., Blake v. Ferris,
5 N.Y. 48 (1851); Hilliard v. Richardson, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 349 (1855), cited in W. KEETON,
D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 71 n.4
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]; Painter v. Mayor, Citizens & Alder-
man of Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. 213 (1863).
42. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, § 71.
43. This phrase, which literally means, "let the master answer," stands for "the proposi-
1500
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ployer or the contractor should be liable for torts committed during work
depended on an analysis under the "entrepreneur theory."'  The early
view was that because an employer has no right to control the manner in
which a contractor performs his work, the enterprise should be regarded
as the contractor's, who is in a better position to prevent, administer and
distribute the risk.4" The majority rule that forbids suits by construction
workers against the owner-employers of the workers' employer-contrac-
tors reflects this view.46
The "enterprise theory" advocates imposing liability on the owner-
employer because he is the party who will benefit primarily from the
enterprise. An owner-employer who selects his contractor may insist on
financial responsibility and demand indemnity and, as a cost of doing
business, can procure insurance to distribute the risk.47 The peculiar risk
tion that one is liable for the torts of his employes [sic] committed within the scope of their
employment." Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339, 339
(1934). Morris stated that the respondeat superior doctrine may have been "conceived at a
time when the relation of master and servant was one of such close personal surveillance that
there were few cases in which masters were not in some way implicated in the wrongs of their
servants." Id. at 340. Those conditions have changed but the rule remains, so that even an
"exemplary employer may be held liable for a wrong ... he has used every precaution to
prevent." Id. According to Morris, other policies must be found to justify an employer's
liability. He notes the following:
The employe [sic] . . . is usually judgment proof .... The employer. . . can and
should consider this liability as a cost of his business. He may avoid this cost by
staying out of business entirely, or he can plan to carry such losses by insuring
against them and adjusting his prices so that his patrons must bear part, if not all, of
the burden of insurance. In this way losses are spread and the shock of accident is
dispersed.
Id. at 340-41.
44. The "entrepreneur theory" was analyzed in Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Adminis-
tration of Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929). The test under this theory is concerned with four
factors:
(I) Control: the ability to formulate and to execute policies, Le., to make decisions
in respect to the production or marketing functions. (2) Ownership: the legal (or
equitable) title to the property used in the performance of the production or market-
ing functions. (3) Losses: the investment which is staked on the success of the ven-
ture. (4) Profits: the chance to receive a monetary gain from the transaction.
Id. at 595-96. Using this analysis, a court can determine whether the owner-employer or con-
tractor has more characteristics of an entrepreneur for purposes of imposing liability. Id. at
596.
45. Comment, Liability of Landowners Resultant From Their Employment of Independent
Contractors, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 147, 147 (1961); see also Morris, supra note 43, at 343. Morris
noted that the rationale for finding that it is unjust to hold one person liable for the torts of
another he cannot direct overlooks the fact that the employer selects the contractor. Id. at
343-44.
46. See supra note 17 for a list of the few jurisdictions which do not follow the majority
rule.
47. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, at § 71.
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doctrine as applied in California reflects this reasoning.48
B. Development of Exceptions
Although owner-employer nonliability for the torts of independent
contractors remains the favored view, numerous exceptions have miti-
gated it. These exceptions to the nonliability rule led one court to ob-
serve that it is applied "only 'where no good reason is found for
departing from it.' ,,4
In the context of landowners, numerous exceptions to the general
rule of nonliability developed. In addition to an owner-employer's liabil-
ity for his own negligence,50 he retains certain nondelegable duties "aris-
ing out of some relation toward the public or the particular plaintiff."5'
For example, landowners have a duty to invitees, including workers, to
protect them against dangerous conditions on the land. 2 Similarly, own-
ers are under a nondelegable duty to injured persons where they retain
control and direction of work,53 where work is performed under a public
franchise 4 or where a statute forbids delegation."
C. The Peculiar Risk Exception
The peculiar risk doctrine developed to remedy the injustice that
48. See discussion of entrepreneur liability theory in the California Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Snyder v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955); see infra notes
114-19.
49. Walker v. Capistrano Saddle Club, 12 Cal. App. 3d 894, 898, 90 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914
(1970) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409). Prosser commented that the gen-
eral rule covers only those exceptional cases which do not fit into one of the categories of
exceptions. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 71, n.94 (4th ed. 1971).
50. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Topic 1, Introductory Note (1965) lists the
following duties of an employer: to exercise reasonable care in giving orders for the work, id.
§ 410; to select a competent contractor, id. § 411; to inspect the work for safety, id. § 412; to
provide for precautions required because of a special risk, id. § 413; to exercise reasonable care
over work on which he retains control, id. § 414; and to supervise equipment and methods of
persons doing work on his land, id. §§ 414A, 415.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 comment b (1965).
52. Id. § 414A.
53. See supra note 10.
54. See, e.g., Delgado v. W.C. Garcia & Assocs., 212 Cal. App. 2d 5, 27 Cal. Rptr. 613
(1963) (nondelegable duty to the public imposed on owners where they constructed sewers
under contract with city).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965). See, e.g., Golden v. Conway, 55
Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). Although under common law there is no liability
of owner to tenant for defective premises, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714a (West Supp. 1986) imposes
statutory nondelegable duty of reasonable care in management of property. Although work-
ers' compensation statutes impose duties on employers to provide for worker safety, these
standards are not admissible in a third party action. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying
text.
PECULIAR RISK DOCTRINE
occurred when persons injured outside an owner's land, as a result of
work performed on the land, were unable to recover because of the land-
owner's immunity for torts committed by independent contractors. The
usual situations involved an adjacent landowner whose house suffered
damage because of excavation work56 or a passerby who tripped over
unguarded construction materials or fell into uncovered excavations in
the street.5 7
The case commonly recognized as the first expression of the peculiar
risk exception is Bower v. Peate,58 an 1876 English decision. In Bower, a
landowner hired an independent contractor to erect a house, which ne-
cessitated some excavation work. The owner was held liable for injury to
a neighbor's house. The court held that:
a man who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the
natural course of things, injurious consequences to his neigh-
bour must be expected to arise, unless means are adopted by
which such consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to
the doing of that which is necessary to prevent the mischief,
and cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing
some one else .. .
However, even earlier, the United States Supreme Court had held in
Chicago v. Robbins 61 that a landowner would be liable for failure to re-
quire an independent contractor to provide lights and guards for work
conducted on a public sidewalk.61
Although this concept was termed "peculiar risk" by the drafters of
the Restatement (First) of Torts,62 most American courts have preferred
the terms "intrinsic" or "inherent" danger.63 While the distinction is not
56. See, e.g., Bower & Peate, I Q.B.D. 321 (1876); see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying
text.
57. See Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. 418 (1862); see infra notes 60-61 and accompanying
text.
58. 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876).
59. Id. at 326.
60. 67 U.S. 418 (1862).
61. Id. at 427. Work ordered by the defendant landowner included an excavation in an
adjoining sidewalk. The plaintiff fell in the unguarded excavation. The Court held that where
an owner
fails to provide with his contractor for the very matter which, if left undone, would
make it a nuisance; is told of the dangerous condition of the area; has a direct super-
vision over it... and yet, when an injury is suffered by the very nuisance which he
has created for his own benefit, ... insists that he is not in fault ..... [i]f the owner
of fixed property is not responsible in such a case as this, it would be difficult ever to
charge him with responsibility.
Id.
62. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 416 (1934).
63. "Intrinsic" danger was first defined in 4 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1722
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commented on in the first Restatement of Torts, according to the second
Restatement, inherently dangerous work necessitates a number of pre-
cautions' while work involving a peculiar risk usually requires a single
precaution.65 For the most part, though, the concepts have been used
interchangeably.66 As defined by the drafters of the first Restatement of
Torts, the peculiar risk rule encompassed few situations. The first Re-
statement listed only three illustrations of its application: demolition of
buildings, tearing down walls and excavation work.67 Thus, questions as
to other possible applications remained to be addressed by American
courts and by drafters of the second Restatement.
D. The Limits of Owner-Employer Liability Under the Peculiar Risk
Doctrine in the Majority of Jurisdictions
As the first Restatement peculiar risk doctrine was applied by courts
around the nation, a major question that arose was whether employees of
(5th ed. 1911). Judge Dillon stated, "where the contract directly requires the performance of
work intrinsically dangerous, however skillfully performed[,] ...the party authorizing the
work is justly regarded as the author of the mischief resulting from it, whether he does the
work himself or lets it out by contract." Id. (emphasis in original).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 (1965), states the rule of liability for work
that an employer should recognize as entailing risks inherent in or normal to the work. It
provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger
to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or
normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when
making the contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by
the contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger.
Id. Examples of inherent risk activities are blasting and painting on a scaffold over a highway.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 comment a (1965).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 comment a (1965) discusses this
distinction:
There is a close relation between the rule stated in this Section, and that stated
in § 427, as to dangers inherent in or normal to the work. The two rules represent
different forms of statement of the same general rule, that the employer remains lia-
ble for injuries resulting from dangers which he should contemplate at the time that
he enters in to the contract, and cannot shift to the contractor the responsibility for
such dangers, or for taking precautions against them. The rules stated in the two
Sections have been applied more or less interchangeably in the same types of cases,
and frequently have been stated in the same opinion as the same rule, or as different
phases of the same rule. The rule stated in this Section is more commonly stated and
applied where the employer should anticipate the need for some specific precaution,
such as a railing around an excavation in the sidewalk. The rule stated in § 427 is
more commonly applied where the danger involved in the work calls for a number of
precautions, or involves a number of possible hazards, as in the case of blasting, or
painting carried on upon a scaffold above the highway.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 comment a (1965), states that §§ 416 and
427 are so closely related that they are commonly regarded as "different phases of the same
rule."
67. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 413 comment a (1934).
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contractors would be permitted under the doctrine to sue the landowner
who had hired those contractors or whether the doctrine was to be lim-
ited to passersby or other third parties. Although California was to an-
swer this question in the affirmative, a majority position developed that
prohibited this application of the doctrine.
1. Proposed limitation in the second Restatement of Torts
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1965, expanded the
peculiar risk doctrine by broadening its definition68 and providing addi-
tional categories of illustrations.69
One very important proposed limitation to the second Restatement
did not appear in the published version. A proposed "special note"7 to
the chapter on liability for the conduct of independent contractors stated
that the rules were inapplicable to a defendant's own employees or to the
employees of an independent contractor. 71 The proponents of this spe-
cial note reasoned that because premiums for workers' compensation in-
surance are included in the contract price paid by an owner, the owner
has in effect borne the cost of workers' injuries. 72 "[Cumbersome difli-
culties in drafting," however, prevented the authors from making this
point clear within the text of the rules.73 However, the drafters decided
to eliminate the note from the final version due to differences in state
workers' compensation laws. 74
2. Judicial limitation based on the second Restatement of Torts
Though not officially adopted, the introductory note has been
quoted and relied on by the majority of courts that have rejected the
applicability of the doctrine for contractors' employees. The same year
68. The requirement that the risk be foreseeable as "necessarily creating" a risk of harm
was changed to read "likely to create" harm. The phrase "conditions containing an unreason-
able risk of physical harm" was changed to "a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416 (1965). See supra note 14 for text of § 413.
69. One modem example is seen in the second Restatement, § 416 comment d, which notes
that an employer would be liable if injury resulted because a contractor employed to transport
giant logs failed to anchor them on his truck. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413
comment d, appendix (1966).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT, ch. 15 special note (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
71. Id.
72. Id. The drafters acknowledged that workers' compensation statutes frequently provide
for third party liability, but stated, "it has not been thought necessary to impose such liability
upon one who hires the contractor." Id.
73. Id. at ch. 15 special notes 17-18 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
74. 39 A.L.I. PROC. 246 (1962) (statement of William Prosser). Dean Prosser stated, "it
appears undesirable, if not impossible, to state anything at all about what the liability is to
employees of an independent contractor." Id.
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the second Restatement was adopted, the Arizona Court of Appeal pub-
lished an influential decision, Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., that dis-
cussed the note, the Restatement text and other policy factors as support
for its position that such workers were not covered by the rule. In
Welker, the court observed that the introductory note to Chapter 15 of
the Restatement referred to the owner's nondelegable duty to provide
safe conditions in relation to "completed work,"76 rather than "transi-
tory conditions during construction .... ."I' Next, the court noted that
none of the comments to the second Restatement's various peculiar risk
sections78 refer to a duty to employees of independent contractors.79
However, while it is true that these sections do not refer to employees of
independent contractors, other sections in the chapter on owner-em-
ployer liability do cite examples of injured workers who are owed a
duty.80 The Welker court also distinguished the peculiar risk duties from
the duty of using due diligence to exercise control the owner retains, as
that duty is defined in section 414.81 In such a situation, the owner
would be liable to workers because he chose not to delegate his duties to
the contractors.82
The Arizona court also emphasized that Restatement section 416
comment c states "[t]he liability imposed by the rule... is no greater
75. 1 Ariz. App. 395, 403 P.2d 330 (1965) (employee of subcontractor killed while digging
a trench below bank of excavation that collapsed on him; trial court ruling permitting issue of
owner-employer negligence in exercise of control over work as proximate cause of death re-
versed and remanded for new trial). The decision has been cited by courts in other states,
including: Alaska (State v. Morris, 555 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Alaska 1976)); Kentucky (King v.
Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Ky. 1973)); and New Jersey (Donch v.
Delta Inspection Serv., Inc., 166 N.J. Super. 558, 573, 398 A.2d 925, 928 (N.J. 1979)).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 15 special note (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
77. 1 Ariz. App. at 402, 403 P.2d at 337.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416, 423, 427 (1965).
79. 1 Ariz. App. at 402, 403 P.2d at 337.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 409-429 (1965). While most of the illustra-
tions of an owner-employer's liability to third persons given therein refer to passersby or ad-
joining landowners, the following illustrations concern construction workers.
Section 422 states that a landowner who retains control over his land while an independ-
ent contractor works on it is liable to injured third persons. Illustration 2 states that the
landowner would not be liable where "[t]he premises are turned over to the contractor, who is
in full possession and control of them. While the work is in progress B, a workman employed
by a subcontractor, is injured by falling into an excavation which the contractor has negligently
left unguarded." Id. § 422 illustration 2 (emphasis added).
Section 425 holds employers of independent contractors liable for negligently maintained
equipment supplied to others. Under illustration 3, a general contractor would be liable for
injuries to a worker of a subcontractor suffered on scaffolding negligently repaired by one of
the general contractor's other subcontractors. Id. § 425 illustration 3.
81. Id. § 414.
82. Walker, 1 Ariz. App. at 405, 403 P.2d at 337.
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than that to which the employer would be subject if he retained the tak-
ing of these precuations in his own hands ... ."" The Welker court
reasoned that if an owner had the work performed by his own employees,
his liability would be limited to the payment of workers' compensation
benefits.
84
Finally, the court concluded that the definition of a peculiar risk was
"difficult to apply in the extreme" 85 because it includes work of a type
likely to produce injuries unless precautions are taken. 86 The court rea-
soned that in the construction industry
[i]t is probably inconceivable.., that work of this magnitude
could be performed without some personal injury to the em-
ployees.... And every major construction job has its own pe-
culiar dangers arising from special jobsite factors, or the
combinations of work that must be performed.87
The California Supreme Court rejected this argument as a basis for limit-
ing application of the doctrine in its most recent peculiar risk case,
Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc.88
Other policy considerations for rejecting the application of the doc-
trine for the benefit of workers were discussed by the Minnesota Supreme
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 comment c (1965).
84. 1 Ariz. App. at 404, 403 P.2d at 339. The court stated:
[A]s to the employees engaged in the work to be performed, the contractee is not
"escaping" liability by contracting with an independent contractor. The contractee
either directly or indirectly pays Workmen's Compensation premiums. No valid rea-
son occurs to this court to penalize the legal-industrial tool of the contract with an
independent contractor, so as to increase the liability of the builder simply because
this device is used. The reason for the exception to the general rule being absent, the
court does not believe that the exception should pertain.
Id.
In addition to comprising the subject of the Restatement special note, see supra note 70,
courts in other states have relied heavily on the owner indirectly paying worker's compensa-
tion as a reason for rejecting application of the rule for contractors' employees. See, e.g., Johns
v. New York Blower Co., 442 N.E.2d 382, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); King v. Shelby Rural
Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ky. 1973); Conover v. Northern States Power Co.,
313 N.W.2d 397, 406 (Minn. 1981); Donch v. Delta Inspection Servs. Inc., 165 N.J. Super.
567, 574, 398 A.2d 925, 929 (1979).
85. 1 Ariz. App. at 404, 403 P.2d at 339.
86. Id.
A substantial difference between the general rule... [of nonliability] and the excep-
tion now under consideration is that in the one case the work is of such character,
that, if properly done, no injurious consequences can arise, and in the other the work
is of a character from which damages are likely to arise unless precautionary meas-
ures are adopted.
Id. (quoting 57 CJ.S. Master and Servant § 590a (1948)).
87. 1 Ariz. App. at 404, 403 P.2d at 339.
88. 23 Cal. 3d 578, 591 P.2d 503, 153 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1979); see infra notes 226-28 and
accompanying text.
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Court in Conover v. Northern States Power Co. 9 That court found that
the doctrine imposed "one... duty too many" 90 on owners because the
contractors employing workers already have a nondelegable duty to pro-
vide a safe workplace. Moreover, the court stated that the job risks were
created by the contractors, not by those employing them: "one who hires
an independent contractor with employees specialized to do the hazard-
ous work should not be penalized by being held vicariously liable for an
injury to those employees." 91  The court concluded that each party
should be liable for its own conduct according to its separate duties of
care.92 Because owners as land possessors have a personal duty to per-
sons coming onto their premises, the court noted that the effect of deny-
ing workers recovery under the nondelegable peculiar risk duty is "more
theoretical than real."93 The Minnesota court rejected the argument that
the nondelegable duty was necessary to keep jobsites safe, reasoning that
this could be accomplished by holding owners liable for their own fault
in negligently hiring a contractor or failing to take needed precautions.94
E. Employer-Owner Liability Under California Law
1. Before the first Restatement of Torts
California law had not developed the peculiar or inherent risk ex-
ceptions prior to the 1934 publication of the first Restatement of Torts.
95
89. 313 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1981). In Conover, a power company hired an independent
contractor to move power lines from old poles to new ones. Plaintiff lineman, employee of the
contractor, fell when the old pole upon which he was working broke. The trial court's judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict for defendant was reversed in part and affirmed in part, with
the court holding the evidence was sufficient to support a determination that the defendant
breached a personal duty owed to plaintiff, but that defendant could not be held vicariously
liable under the Restatement nondelegable duties, including peculiar risk, for injuries to its
subcontractor's employee. Id. at 403.
90. Id. at 404.
91. Id. at 405 (discussing Vagle v. Pickards Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1979)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 406.
94. Id. The court reasoned that:
[I]t would seem the employer's exposure for his own personal fault to the contrac-
tor's employee is sufficient incentive for the employer to hire a competent contractor
and to take needed precautions. Any nondelegable duty that might be additionally
imposed could still be avoided where the employer has sufficient bargaining power to
obtain an indemnity agreement from the contractor. In addition, intejecting a non-
delegable duty into this basic relationship may create a disincentive for safety. The
contractor, who is supposed to be on the jobsite supervising, may have less incentive
to provide a safe workplace if the employer is indirectly paying his workers' compen-
sation premiums and, in addition, the contractor has subrogation rights against the
employer.
Id.
95. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934). See COMM. OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. IN
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The landowner's insulation from liability for the negligence of independ-
ent contractors had been firmly established since the California Supreme
Court's 1857 decision in Boswell v. Laird,96 decided nineteen years before
Bower v. Peate.97 In Boswell, two miners who were not landowners en-
gaged architects to build a dam. Before the dam was completed, water
broke through and swept a store downstream. 98 The court held that be-
cause the relationship of the miners and architects was that of employer-
independent contractor, not employer-employee, the contractors alone
were liable for damages.99 In so holding, the court adopted a line of
English decisions that favored owner-employer nonliability unless the
control of a master-servant relationship was present.' °° The court noted
that the owner-employers would have been liable if the plan had been
theirs,10 1 if the work itself had created a nuisance, 102 or if they had ac-
cepted and begun use of the dam.
10 3
Subsequent California cases which did impose owner-employer lia-
bility were not based on the inherent risk rationale, rather on the concept
of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, referred to in the Boswell deci-
sion."° The phrase, which means that an owner must "use [his] own
property in such a manner as not to injure... [others],"' 05 was applied
to impose liability where work created a nuisance, 0 6 where a "special
relationship" between the defendant and adjacent landowners existed
10 7
CHARGE OF ANNOTATION, CAL. ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 413, 416 (1940).
96. 8 Cal. 469 (1857).
97. 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876); see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
98. 8 Cal. at 488.
99. Id. at 494-95.
100. Id. at 495-96 (citing Reedie v. London & N.W. Ry. Co., 154 Eng. Rep. 1201 (1849);
Allen v. Haywood, 115 Eng. Rep. 749 (1845); MUlligan v. Wedge, 113 Eng. Rep. 993 (1840);
Quarman v. Burnett, 151 Eng. Rep. 509 (1840); Laugher v. Pointer, 108 Eng. Rep. 204
(1826)).
101. Id. at 498.
102. Id. at 497. The owner-employer would be liable where "the injury results, not from
the manner in which the dam [was] erected, but from the fact that it is erected at all." Id. For
example, the owner-employer would be liable if erecting the dam had diverted water to flood a
neighbor's land. Id.
103. Id. at 498.
104. Id. at 494.
105. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See Comment, Liability for the
Torts of Independent Contractors in California, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 762, 766 n.33 (1956).
106. See supra note 102.
107. Comment, supra note 105, at 767 (citations omitted). "In California it is the existence
of a special relationship, and not inherent danger in the activity, which consistently appears as
the basis for ignoring the general rule of employer nonliability." Id. See infra notes 220-21
and accompanying text for one court's position that a special relationship is a requirement for
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or where the defendant held a public franchise to perform an activity. °8
For example, while other states used the inherent risk exception to im-
pose liability for aerial pesticide spraying, California courts achieved the
same result with the sic utere doctrine. 0 9 Thus, exceptions to the rule of
landowner nonliability developed slowly in California, most likely be-
cause of the influence of Boswell v. Laird 110 and the sic utere doctrine.
2. California adoption of the first Restatement
References to the first Restatement began to appear in California
opinions soon after its publication, though the limited exceptions to land-
owner nonliability still were based on nuisance, adjacent landowner sta-
tus and public franchise. 11 In Courtell v. McEachen,"2 the California
Supreme Court indicated that the peculiar risk doctrine could be applied
in determining landowner liability to children hurt while playing on a
vacant lot.
11 3
a. employees as "others" protected
In 1955, the California Supreme Court first applied the peculiar risk
doctrine to create owner-employer liability. The plaintiffs in Snyder v.
Southern California Edison Co.114 were linemen employed by an in-
dependent contractor of the defendant. They were injured when a power
pole improperly installed by a subcontractor of Southern California
Edison fell on them.115 Liability in the case was based on a duty under a
public franchise. The court concluded that "the duty imposed upon [the
utility company] by the [public utility] statute and commission could
[not] be delegated to an independent contractor so as to insulate defend-
ant from liability because of the failure of the contractor to perform the
duties." '116 The court quoted extensively from Harper's Law of Torts,'17
imposition of liability on employers of independent contractors regardless of the existence of a
peculiar risk.
108. Comment, supra note 105, at 769 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 766; see cases cited id. at 766 nn.31-32 applying the inherent risk exception.
110. 8 Cal. 469 (1857); see supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
111. Comment, supra note 105, at 772. For a discussion of other bases of contractor liabil-
ity, see generally Brooks, Tort Liability of Owners and General Contractors for On-the-Job
Injuries to Workmen, 13 UCLA L. REV. 99 (1965).
112. 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959).
113. Id. at 456-57, 334 P.2d at 874.
114. 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955).
115. Id. at 795, 285 P.2d at 913.
116. Id. at 797, 285 P.2d at 914.
117. Id. at 799, 285 P.2d at 915 (citing F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 292 (1933)). Harper
named two categories of cases involving imposition of liability on entrepreneurs: "nondelega-
ble" duty by reason of a relationship with others, such as was found in Snyder, and intrinsi-
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declaring a policy of entrepreneurial responsibility for torts resulting in
injuries to employees of contractors. However, in another case published
the same day,' 18 the court made it clear that the general rule of nonliabil-
ity would not be abrogated: "[T]he owner may retain a broad general
power of supervision and control as to the results of the work so as to
insure satisfactory performance of the independent contract.., without
changing the.., duties arising from that relationship."1 9 Nevertheless,
the Snyder decision foreshadowed the court's broadening of owner duties
through application of the peculiar risk doctrine for the benefit of injured
workers employed by independent contractors.
In 1962, the California Supreme Court decided Woolen v. Aerojet
General Corp.,12° involving a worker asphyxiated while applying a flam-
mable coating inside a tank with inadequate ventilation. 121 In reversing a
judgment for the plaintiffs, the court held that the jury instructions given
failed to consider the elements required for liability under the peculiar
risk doctrine.1 2 2 The court stated that the definitions of "others" in the
Restatement included the employees of independent contractors, and
cited previous decisions which also included employees in the phrase
"others" protected under alternative sections of the Restatement.23
Moreover, the court cited decisions of other jurisdictions which extended
cally dangerous work which is either extra-hazardous unless special precautions are taken or is
inherently dangerous in any event. The latter category generally expresses the principle of the
peculiar risk doctrine, though Harper limits its application to extreme hazards.
118. McDonald v. Shell Oil Co., 44 Cal. 2d 785, 285 P.2d 902 (1955); see infra notes 175-77
and accompanying text.
119. McDonald, 44 Cal. 2d at 790, 285 P.2d at 904; see infra note 177 and accompanying
text.
120. 57 Cal. 2d 407, 369 P.2d 708, 20 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1962).
121. Id. at 408-09, 369 P.2d at 709-10, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 13-14. Although the product con-
tained labels warning that fresh air must be continuously provided during application to pre-
vent an explosive concentration of vapors, the contract contained no provisions for such
precautions. Moreover, the independent contractor supplied no safety equipment to his em-
ployees. Only a week prior to the explosion, Aerojet had furnished all equipment and material
to another painting contractor for application of the product, but had also provided explosion-
proof lights and a blower to eliminate fumes. Id. at 408-09, 369 P.2d at 710, 20 Cal. Rptr. at
14.
122. Id. at 411-12, 369 P.2d at 711-12, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16. The instructions also failed
to take into consideration whether, apart from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 413 (1934), defend-
ant had such control over the premises and work as to give rise to an independent duty to
inspect. Id. at 411-12, 369 P.2d at 711-12, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
123. Woolen, 57 Cal. 2d at 410-11, 369 P.2d at 711, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 15 (disapproving
contrary dicta in Bedford v. Bechtel Corp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 401, 414, 342 P.2d 495, 503
(1959)). The court had already defined employees as "others" within the meaning of §§ 414
and 428 of the first Restatement in Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal. 2d 225,
232-34, 282 P.2d 69, 73-74 (1955) and in Snyder v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793,
798, 285 P.2d 912 (1955); see supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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the peculiar risk duty to employees of independent contractors.1 24
In another 1962 supreme court case, Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaf-
folds,125 a worker fell thirty feet from an inadequate scaffold while using
an unsafe work method to repair a storage tank.126 The court reversed a
judgment for the defendant tank owner and held that, upon retrial, 127 the
trier of fact should consider whether the owner-employer knew that the
plan used to accomplish the job was unsafe and whether the employee
was contributorily negligent. 28
The proposed introductory note to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts did not prompt California to modify its application of the peculiar
risk rule in favor of employees. Shortly after publication of the second
124. Woolen, 57 Cal. 2d at 411, 369 P.2d at 711, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 15 (citing Mallory v.
Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S.W.2d 617, 623-27 (1928); International
Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn. App. 425, 222 S.W.2d 854, 865-68 (1948); Annot., 23
A.L.R. FED. 1084, 1129-35 (1923)).
125. 57 Cal. 2d 651, 371 P.2d 311, 21 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1962).
126. Id. at 652-54, 371 P.2d at 312-13, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77. Plaintiff's employer was an
independent contractor engaged to repair a 40-foot storage tank damaged by fire and explo-
sion. The contractor removed the top of the tank and placed a tower-like scaffold on wheels
inside. The scaffold contained supports at various levels, across which the workers placed
planks. The workers stood on these planks while they labored. To straighten the buckles and
creases in the tank, a pipe with an attacked hydraulic jack was suspended from a crane boom
that moved the pipe to the level of repairs. The workers used a five-foot steel bar to manipu-
late the jack to expand the length of the pipe and force the buckle outward. The plaintiff stood
on a platform, which was 30 inches wide and consisting of three planks, at the 23-foot level
while he forced the buckled metal outward with the jack and steel bar. When he retracted the
jack, the buckle sprang inward and the steel bar struck him, knocking him to the ground. Id.
at 653-54, 371 P.2d at 313, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
The court noted that more planks could have been placed at the level where the plaintiff
worked and that there were no side railings. A mechanical engineer testified for plaintiff that
the work method was "unusually dangerous" because of the danger of collapse due to the
unstable condition of the damaged metal, and to the danger of "spring back" in the buckles
coupled with the flimsy scaffold. The engineer testified that the usual method would have been
to repair from outside the tank, with the sides braced against collapse and scaffolds welded to
the sides. Id. at 654-55, 371 P.2d at 313-14, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
127. The court had no difficulty in finding that the unsafe work method employed was
"necessarily dangerous.., in the absence of precautions." Id. at 656, 371 P.2d at 314, 21 Cal.
Rptr. at 578. However, it affirmed an order for new trial on the issue of whether the tank
owner reasonably could have been expected to know of the danger, and whether plaintiff was
aware of the danger. Id.
128. The tank owner asserted that plaintiff must have been fully aware of the danger, and
thus defended on the basis of contributory negligence. Under CAL. LAB. CODE § 2801 (West
1971), where an employee seeks to recover against an employer in a negligence action,
the fact that such employee has been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a
recovery therein where his contributory negligence was slight and that of the em-
ployer was gross, in comparison, but the damages may be diminished by the jury in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee.




Restatement, the supreme court decided Van Arsdale v. Hollinger,"' ap-
plying the peculiar risk rule in favor of an injured worker in a work situa-
tion which was not nearly as extreme as that in Woolen or Ferrel. In Van
Arsdale, the plaintiff, who worked for an independent contractor, was hit
by a car while he was eradicating street lines near a major Los Angeles
intersection. At the time of the accident, the contractor had not pro-
vided flagmen as required by its contract with the City of Los Angeles.
The plaintiff wore dark clothing, without a bright jacket. The contractor
had also instructed the plaintiff to work beyond the safety cones warning
of the work. A City inspector was on duty to ensure that work was being
performed to specifications.13
The jury found the plaintiff's employer, and not the City or the
plaintiff himself, negligent. 31 The supreme court reversed the judgment
for the defendant City on the basis of its nondelegable duty of due
care.
132
The supreme court's opinions in Snyder, Woolen, Ferrel and Van
Arsdale represented a dramatic shift from general owner-employer nonli-
ability to an "entrepreneur" liability policy protecting the employees of
contractors under the peculiar risk doctrine. Though few other states
have followed the California Supreme Court's reasoning, 133 contempo-
rary California decisions have continued to expand the peculiar risk doc-
trine from its limited origins.
III. WORK SITUATIONS WHICH INVOLVE PECULIAR RISK
Under the second Restatement and the cases interpreting it, peculiar
risks are " 'special, recognizable danger[s] arising out of' " the work it-
self.'3 4 The Restatement clarifies that "peculiar" does not mean that the
129. 68 Cal. 2d 245, 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1968).
130. Id. at 248, 437 P.2d at 510, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
131. Id. at 248-49, 437 P.2d at 510, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
132. Id. at 256-57, 437 P.2d at 515-16, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28. The court cited the Califor-
nia Law Revision Committee's comments that public entities may be liable for the acts of their
independent contractors. Stating that "[i]t is clear that the liability of an employer of an in-
dependent contractor for the latter's tortious conduct is broad.. .... id. at 253, 437 P.2d at 513,
66 Cal. Rptr. at 25, the court quoted language of Snyder v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 44 Cal.
2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955). See supra notes 114-17. The court again listed considerations
which have led courts to depart from the rule of nonliability of a private employer for the torts
of an independent contractor. 68 Cal. 2d at 250-52, 437 P.2d at 511-13, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 23-25.
Although the court could have based the City's liability on the rule of nondelegable duty
of public entities, it concluded as a matter of law that the conditions under which the plaintiff
worked constituted a situation of nondelegable duty of due care. Id. at 254, 437 P.2d at 514,
66 Cal. Rptr. at 26 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 illustrations 1 & 3).
133. See supra note 17.
134. See Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 510, 595 P.2d 619, 623, 156
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risk is "abnormal" to the work, or "abnormally great," but rather that
the risk is uniquely identifiable in advance as part of a given activity.
135
As the California Supreme Court stated in Griesel v. Dart Industries
Inc.,136 even the fact that an activity involves a danger that is ordinary to
particular work does not preclude a finding of a "peculiar risk."'1
37
Construction work is particularly filled with routine dangers.
Whether these dangers rise to the level of peculiar risks is a question of
fact in each case. 138 The circumstances of each case must be analyzed to
determine whether the construction activity entailed a risk of injury rec-
ognizable in advance, whether precautions were provided, whether such
precautions were reasonable and, finally, whether the injury actually re-
sulted from the peculiar risk or from some negligence collateral to the
risk.
A. Knowledge and Foreseeability Prerequisites
Before the peculiar risk doctrine may be applied, it must be shown
that the activity involves a risk that is recognizable in advance and which
arises from the character or place of the work. 139 Considerations in de-
termining whether a risk is recognizable include both the relative sophis-
tication of the employer and the foreseeability of the particular harm
requiring prevention through precautions.
1. Sophistication of employer
Section 413, comment f, of the Restatement makes it clear that a
widow unfamiliar with construction or contracting who orders repairs on
her house is held to a lower standard of knowledge than an industrial
employer. 14" The Restatement does not give other examples of how the
relative sophistication of an employer may affect his liability. Not sur-
prisingly, California courts usually hold that construction employers
meet the knowledge requirement. 141 One court stated, "[u]nlike the ordi-
nary person, ... [the defendant developer's] officials and employees were
Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1979) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comment b (1965));
see infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comment b (1965).
136. 23 Cal. 3d 578, 591 P.2d 503, 153 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1979).
137. Id. at 587, 591 P.2d at 508, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
138. See, e.g., Mackey v. Campbell Constr. Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 774, 162 Cal. Rptr. 64
(1980). "[WMhether the work is likely to create a peculiar risk... is ordinarily a question to be
resolved by the trier of fact." Id. at 785, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comment b (1965).
140. Id. § 413 comment f.
141. See, eg., Widman v. Rossmoor Sanitation Inc., 19 Cal. App. 3d 739, 747, 97 Cal. Rptr.
52, 59 (1971). The defendant, a subsidiary of a large developer, argued that "the classification
1514
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knowledgeable in all phases of construction work and recognized, or
should have recognized, that... [the work] was likely to create a pecu-
liar risk." '142 In Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co.,143 where several brew-
eries contracted for demolition work, the California Supreme Court
observed that although the breweries did not have
as much knowledge and experience regarding the dangers of
demolition work as builders or demolishers, it [was] not unrea-
sonable to expect them as business entities to have recognized
that the work to be done would require the taking of special
precautions to prevent harm to both the workers and the
public. 144
2. Foreseeability of danger
a. custom and practice
For the same reasons that it is reasonable to assume that construc-
tion employers have a general knowledge of the dangers entailed in the
projects they undertake, it is also fair to assume that they should foresee
the specific risks involved in their work.
To establish the extent of an employer's or contractor's knowledge,
plaintiffs introduce evidence of the custom and practice regarding safety
in the construction industry. Work on construction sites is subject to
California Industrial Safety Orders. 145 Although direct evidence of con-
struction safety orders is inadmissible in civil third party actions, 146 ex-
perts generally testify that the custom and practice in the industry is to
follow safety orders. In fact, courts have rejected arguments that follow-
ing custom and practice excuses violation of those safety orders.147
Formerly, an evidentiary presumption of negligence for violation of
statutory standards sometimes assisted plaintiffs in establishing their
case. Under California Evidence Code section 669,148 a rebuttable pre-
of deep excavation work as an ultra-hazardous activity would expose to liability every poor
widow" who has a swimming pool built. Id. at 746, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
142. Id. at 747, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
143. 24 Cal. 3d 502, 595 P.2d 619, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1979).
144. Id. at 510, 595 P.2d at 621, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 45. See infra notes 193-95 and accompa-
nying text.
145. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, ch. 4(4).
146. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6304.5 (West Supp. 1986). For text, see infra note 156.
147. See, e.g., Anderson v. L.C. Smith Constr. Co., 276 Cal. App. 2d 436, 81 Cal. Rptr. 73
(1969), where the court stated: "a usage in violation of the law can never grow into a valid
custom." Id. at 444, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (quoting 49 CAL. JUR. 2D Usages and Customs § 19
(1959)).
148. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a) (West Supp. 1986) provides in pertinent part:
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sumption 14 9 of failure to exercise due care arises where a defendant vio-
lates a statute intended to protect the person whose injuries proximately
result from the violation. 150 Until 1972, a very broad definition of "em-
ployer"15 theoretically subjected virtually all construction defendants
with any supervisory control to a presumption of negligence if safety or-
der violations were shown.
Despite this broad definition, the California Supreme Court held
that owners and general contractors with only general supervisory pow-
ers were not to be regarded as "employers," and thus were not required
to comply with safety orders." 2 One effect of imposing such a standard
would have been to make employer-owners insurers of every piece of
equipment used by independent contractors. When the Woolen v. Aerojet
General Corp.1 - 3 court announced the application of the peculiar risk
doctrine for the benefit of workers, it stated that the California Labor
Code safety standards were not the proper measure of an owner's liabil-
ity.154 However, in certain instances, a plaintiff could introduce evidence
that subcontractors and general contractors had violated safety orders on
The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or injury to his person or property was one of the
class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was
adopted.
149. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(b) (West Supp. 1986) provides in pertinent part:
This presumption may be rebutted by proof that:
(1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might rea-
sonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circum-
stances, who desired to comply with the law ....
150. See infra note 155 for discussion of a case where a court held that workers were in the
class of persons which the safety orders intended to protect.
151. Former CAL. LAB. CODE § 6304 (West 1971) provided in part: "'Employer'... shall
... include every person having direction, management, control, or custody of any employ-
ment, place of employment, or any employee."
152. Kuntz v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 100, 106, 368 P.2d 127, 131, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 527, 531 (1961).
153. 57 Cal. 2d 407, 367 P.2d 708, 20 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1962); see supra notes 120-24 and
accompanying text.
154. Id. at 412-13, 369 P.2d at 712, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
The court also held that the lower court erred in giving instructions relating to Aerojet's
duties as an "employer," holding that § 413 of the Restatement, not the Labor Code, was the
proper measure of defendant's responsibility. Id. at 412-13, 369 P.2d at 712, 20 Cal. Rptr. at
16. Although the court acknowledged that an employer-employee relationship in the usual
sense is not essential for application of the Labor Code, it concluded that "an owner of prem-
ises who does nothing more with respect to the work of an independent contractor than exer-
cise general supervision and control to bring about its satisfactory completion is not an
employer within the meaning of the safety provisions of the Labor Code." Id.
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a job. For example, where a truck backed into a state worker and killed
him, the plaintiffs were permitted to introduce evidence of safety orders
for warning devices on backing trucks in their suit against a general pav-
ing contractor, its subcontractor and a third contractor who furnished
the defective truck. 5'
In 1972, the California State Legislature enacted a law which lim-
ited the admissibility of safety orders to actions against employers.'
5 6
Although the statutory presumption is no longer available, plaintiffs con-
tinue to introduce testimony of expert witnesses, often former state safety
inspectors, that the custom and practice in the industry is to follow the
safety order standards.'57 Thus, despite the inadmissibility of state safety
orders, owner-employers and contractors are effectively held to a stan-
dard requiring them to know and follow those orders.
b. risk causing accident must be foreseen
Even where injury occurs in a peculiar risk situation, if it does not
result from the particular risk which the employer had a duty to foresee,
no liability will be found.
i. ordinary and customary dangers
The risk that an independent contractor will perform work negli-
155. Anderson v. L.C. Smith Constr. Co., 276 Cal. App. 2d 436, 440, 81 Cal. Rptr. 73, 76
(1969). The backing truck lacked the audible warning device required by CAL. IND. SAFETY
ORDERS tit. 8, § 1576(e) (codified as amended at CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, R 1592 (1980)).
Id. at 440, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 75. The paving contractor on the job subcontracted with a trucking
company for six trucks and drivers. That subcontractor arranged for another company to
provide one of the trucks, and that truck had no warning device. The court of appeal held the
safety order was admissible against all three defendants. Id. at 440, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
The defendants argued that the decedent, who was not employed by them, was not within
the class of persons protected by that safety order. See supra note 145. The court concluded
that "the purpose of Safety Order 1576(e) was to protect all persons rightfully in the construc-
tion area." Anderson, 276 Cal. App. 2d at 443, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
156. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6304.5 (West Supp. 1986) was added. It provides:
It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this division shall only be
applicable to proceedings against employers brought pursuant to the provisions of
... [the Labor Code] for the exclusive purpose of maintaining and enforcing em-
ployee safety.
Neither this division nor any part of this division shall have any application to,
nor be considered in, nor be admissible into, evidence in any personal injury or
wrongful death action arising after the operative date of this section, except as be-
tween an employee and his own employer.
The operative date of the statute was April 1, 1972.
157. See, e.g., Mackey v. Campbell Constr. Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 774, 789-90, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 64, 71-72 (1980) (standard to which expert testified was "custom and practice" of indus-
try regarding scaffolds was identical to California Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion standard).
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gently is present on any job. An owner-employer is not liable for every
negligent act of his independent contractor. Under the Restatement, an
employer is not required to take "routine precautions ...which any
careful contractor could reasonably be expected to take, against all of the
ordinary and customary dangers which may arise in the course of the
contemplated work."158 Thus, an owner-employer is not liable if the con-
tractor drives at excessive speeds or with defective brakes.1 19 However, if
the project is transporting giant logs, an owner-employer would be liable
if a contractor failed to take special precautions to anchor the logs be-
cause such an activity requires special precautions apart from those com-
mon to ordinary experience. 160
The fact that work on construction sites routinely requires many
precautions led one trial court to instruct a jury that " 'ordinary and
customary danger[s] of construction work'" were not peculiar risks. 161
However, the California Supreme Court has rejected this approach, hold-
ing that it is immaterial that certain dangers are ordinary and customary
to a particular activity, as is the case in construction. Rather, the test is
whether the owner-employer should have recognized the danger in
advance. 162
ii. collateral negligence
Where injuries result from negligence not connected with the special
precautions required by the peculiar risk doctrine, this negligence is
termed "collateral" to the risk. Restatement section 426163 excepts col-
lateral negligence of contractors from the negligence for which owner-
employers may be held liable. Collateral negligence occurs when:
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comment b (1965).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 416 comment d.
161. Griesel v. Dart Indus., 23 Cal. 3d 578, 587, 591 P.2d 503, 508, 153 Cal. Rptr. 213, 218
(1979).
162. Id. at 586-87, 591 P.2d at 508, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 416 comment e (1965): "It is not essential that the peculiar risk be one which will
necessarily and inevitably arise .... It is sufficient that it is a risk which the employer should
recognize as likely to arise in the course of the ordinary and usual method of doing the work
In reversing the lower court judgment for the defendant employer, the supreme court in
Griesel stated that the jury should have been instructed that " a [trench] cave-in would be a
peculiar risk of the work if the jury found that Dart should have recognized that anyone might
enter the trench before it was properly shored or sloped." 23 Cal. 3d at 587, 591 P.2d at 508,
153 Cal. Rptr. at 218. This reasoning is similar to that in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 413 comment c (1965), where employers are held liable for injuries to passersby if contrac-
tors fail to light excavation work at night.
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426 (1965).
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(a) the contractor's negligence consists solely in the im-
proper manner in which he does the work, and
(b) it creates a risk of such harm which is not inherent in
or normal to the work, and
(c) the employer had no reason to contemplate the con-
tractor's negligence when the contract was made. 16'
Such negligence has also been described as negligence in the "operative
detail" of the work, as distinguished from negligence in the plan
followed.
16-
If the plan or method itself entails dangers, the owner-employer re-
mains liable.1 66 For instance, an owner-employer would be liable if a
worker painting a sign over a public sidewalk dropped a bucket of paint
on a pedestrian.167 If the painter was engaged to work within a building,
and dropped his paint bucket out the window, the negligence would be
collateral because the injury resulted from a risk not inherent in the plan
of the job to be performed.
1 68
In Salinero v. Pon, 69 apartment building owners engaged a contrac-
tor to clean windows. There were no safety hooks on the roof,170 so the
owner-employer and contractor agreed on a plan to suspend boatswain's
chairs weighted down by sandbags from the buildings. One window
washer mistakenly removed the sandbags weighing down the chair in
which his co-worker sat, causing him to fall approximately forty feet.
The court held that the fellow worker's negligence could not be reason-
ably foreseen, was outside the scope of dangers "intimately associated"
with window washing and was therefore collateral. 171 The danger of fall-
164. Id.
165. Id. § 426 comment a.
166. Id. § 416 comment e. See infra notes 229-37 and accompanying text for discussion of
work method as a peculiar risk.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426 illustration 3 (1965).
168. Id. § 426 illustration 4. In Smith v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 3d 826, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 628 (1976), a gust of wind blew part of a sign over on a pedestrian. Workers were
changing the store's name by lowering the letters with cables to the ground. The pedestrian
was injured by a letter that had reached the ground, but was negligently released from the grip
of a worker. The court of appeal found this was a "textbook" example of collateral negligence.
Id. at 829-30, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 630. It noted that the employer would have been liable if the
plaintiff had been injured while the sign was being lowered. Id. at 829, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
169. 124 Cal. App. 3d 120, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1981).
170. Id. at 126, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 206. A cause of action against the architect for failure to
design the five and six story building with safety devices for window washing failed because it
was brought outside the four-year statute of limitations. Id. at 129, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 208. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.1 (Vest 1982).
171. Satinero, 124 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 213. Though not discussed in the
case, the apartment owners' relative lack of sophistication may have been a factor in the
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ing from a great height was contemplated by the owner-employer, and
precautions were devised. Therefore, the defendants were found to have
met their nondelegable duty.'72
iii. work involving contractor equipment
Owner-employers usually are held not liable where injuries are
caused by equipment supplied by an independent contractor, even
though such injuries are a "recognizable danger."' 73 The rationale for
this exception stems from the lack of control over the means of accom-
plishing work which defines the relationship between the owner-em-
ployer and independent contractor. 174 To require an owner-employer to
insure the safety of every piece of his contractor's equipment would evis-
cerate the rule of nonliability for the acts of independent contractors.
However, where the workplan itself presents a peculiar risk, using defec-
tive equipment to accomplish that plan can evidence a failure to take the
special precautions necessary to prevent the harm.
In the 1955 case of McDonald v. Shell Oil Co., 171 the California
Supreme Court held that an owner-employer was not liable for injuries to
an employee of a contractor that resulted from the fall of extremely
heavy steel elevators that were being removed from an oil well. The acci-
dent occurred due to the absence of a safety clamp in a contractor-sup-
plied rig. 176 The court based its holding on the fact that the owner of the
court's decision. See infra note 203 for a discussion of Jacob Doll & Sons v. Ribetti, 203 F. 593
(3d Cir. 1913), where lessees were held liable under similar facts.
172. Salinero, 124 Cal. App. 3d at 139, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
173. See, eg., Stark v. Weeks Real Estate, 94 Cal. App. 3d 965, 156 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1979).
The plaintiff, a carpenter, had wired open the blade guard on a circular saw. He was injured
when he fell from a sawhorse while using the saw. The court found that negligent use of hand
tools involved ordinary negligence--"a usual, common and anticipatable danger in the routine
performance of the work, against which the owner is not required to take special precautions."
Id. at 972, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
174. See supra note 45.
175. 44 Cal. 2d 785, 285 P.2d 902 (1955). This case was announced the same day as Snyder
v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955); see supra notes 114-19.
In McDonald, the plaintiff was the employee of an independent contractor engaged by
defendant Shell Oil to recover casing and to abandon an oil well. He was injured by the fall of
steel elevators weighing 1200 pounds when the rope of a well-pulling rig snapped due to the
absence of a safety clamp. The plaintiff contended that Shell exercised control over the opera-
tions of the independent contractor and knew, or should have known, of the unsafe conditions
on the job site. Id. at 789, 285 P.2d at 904.
176. Id. at 787-88, 285 P.2d at 903. Shell defended on the basis that it did not actively
interfere with or direct the independent contractor in his operations, that it had no duty to
provide safe equipment for the use of plaintiff and that the sole cause of the injuries was the
negligence of the independent contractor and its employees. Id. at 788, 285 P.2d at 903. The
court agreed that the lesser degree of control exercised by Shell over the job shielded Shell
from liability for plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 792, 205 P.2d at 905. The court distinguished
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drilling rig had neither exercised control over the acts of the subcontrac-
tor, nor supplied the allegedly defective materials.17 7
Other courts have cited McDonald for the proposition that work
involving contractor-supplied equipment may not be classified as a pecu-
liar risk.17 However, the fact that work involves the use of a contrac-
tor's equipment does not preclude a finding of a peculiar risk. The
inquiry in each instance must be whether an activity itself involves recog-
nizable dangers in its accomplishment and whether or not those dangers
entail the use of contractor equipment. Under this analysis, for example,
courts have ruled that work near moving vehicles'7 9 and cranes 8 ° may
involve peculiar risks.
B. Particular Construction Activities
1. Work near moving vehicles
An owner-employer is not liable for accidents resulting from the
negligent use of vehicles over which he has no control. In Holman v.
State,""' a heavy equipment operator fell into the unshielded, high-speed
revolving drive-shaft of an earthmover. The court concluded that the
"injuries were caused solely by a defect in... equipment unrelated to any
risk inherent in grading and surfacing the highway ... .""2 If the plain-
tiff had been required to drive under dangerous conditions when the in-
jury occurred, the court noted that the defendant would have been liable
under the peculiar risk doctrine for failing to provide seatbelts or a
rollbar.1
83
In Castro v. State,'I4 the court found that the defendant should have
anticipated a dangerous situation involving moving vehicles and con-
cluded that the precautions taken were inadequate. The plaintiff, a dump
factual situations in which an owner-employer may be liable for injuries to the employee of the
independent contractor: the employee was not injured by a condition of the owner's premises
over which the owner-employer remained in control and where the owner-employer owed du-
ties to the employee as a business invitee; the owner-employer did not furnish the equipment;
and it did not actively interfere with or arbitrarily assume to direct the employees of the in-
dependent contractor as to the manner and method of performing the work. Further, the
work on its property did not constitute a nusiance. Id. at 789-90, 285 P.2d at 905.
177. Id. at 787-88, 285 P.2d at 903.
178. See, eg., Anderson v. Chancellor W. Oil Dev. Corp., 53 Cal. App. 3d 235, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 640 (1975); see infra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
181. 53 Cal. App. 3d 317, 124 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1975).
182. Id. at 331, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
183. Id.
184. 114 Cal. App. 3d 503, 170 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1981).
June 1986] 1521
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1495
truck driver, was working under the hood of his vehicle while he waited
in line to haul excavated dirt. Each truck was required to back a distance
of more than half a block to its place in line. The plaintiff was injured
when one of the trucks struck him while backing up. It was alleged that
the noise of other heavy equipment prevented the truck's backup warn-
ing bells from being heard. The court held that this evidence supported
the jury's finding of peculiar risk, requiring special precautions such as
flagmen, which had not been provided. 8 5
2. Work involving weight or force
Another category of peculiar risk cases is activities involving objects
of great weight or potential force. The Restatement drafters illustrated
this category of work involving peculiar risk by contrasting a contrac-
tor's driving at excessive speed with the failure to anchor "giant logs."'
18 6
The damage to be anticipated from the force and weight of a spill of giant
logs makes their transportation a peculiar risk.
In LaCount v. Hensel Phelps Construction Co.,187 a worker was
struck by two concrete girders weighing about sixteen tons. The
worker's employer was a subcontractor hired to fabricate and install a
load of hundred-ton concrete girders for a rapid transit subway station.
The accident, which occurred in the subcontractor's yard, resulted be-
cause the subcontractor's foreman misjudged the weight of the two gird-
ers. The foreman directed that the girders be lifted on trolley hoists, 18
8
which, in violation of safety orders, were not marked with weight lim-
its.'89 The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, rejecting argu-
ments by the general contractor that the peculiar risk doctrine was
inapplicable as a matter of law because it resulted from "collateral" or
"casual" negligence of the subcontractor. 90 The court stated that load-
185. Id. at 512-13, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 739. See also Anderson v. L.C. Smith Constr. Co., 276
Cal. App. 2d 436, 81 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1969); see supra note 155.
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 comment d (1965).
187. 79 Cal. App. 3d 754, 145 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1978).
188. Id. at 761-62, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 247. "A trolley suspension hoist means a hoist whose
upper suspension member is a trolley for the purpose of running the hoist below a suitable
runway." Id. at 762, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 254 (citing CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 3913(g)
(1984)).
189. Id. at 761, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 247. The safety orders provide in part: "The maximum
rated capacity of all cranes shall be plainly marked on each side of the crane .... " CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 3941(a) (1984). The excess weight on the trolleys caused the girders to
drop, knocking the plaintiff into the water. LaCount, 79 Cal. App. 3d 754, 761, 145 Cal. Rptr.
244, 247.
190. Id. at 769, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 252. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text for a
discussion of "collateral negligence." The court distinguished two cases, Anderson v. Chan-
cellor W. Oil Dev. Corp., 53 Cal. App. 3d 235, 125 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1975), see infra notes 216-
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ing the huge girders was "intimately connected with the work author-
ized." 191  The court also upheld a jury instruction describing the
defendant's statutory duty of care noting that, by statute, the duty was
nondelegable.1 92
In Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., a93 the California Supreme
Court found that demolishing a brewery using a bulldozer to push a 500
pound steel panel presented a "special and recognizable danger" and
thus held the owner-employer liable when the panel fell on the subcon-
tractor's employee. 94 The plaintiff's employer took no precautions to
ensure that workers would not be in the vicinity of the demolition
work. 195
3. Work involving height or depth
Work performed at heights and around equipment at heights always
involves a risk that workers will fall unless special precautions are taken.
Injuries resulting from falls from heights have been held compensable
under the peculiar risk doctrine in the following situations: a worker was
21, and Elder v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 650, 136 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1977), see
infra notes 253-57. The LaCount court stated: "Although Anderson and Elder stand for the
proposition that the concept of peculiar risk is strictly interpreted when an employee of the
independent contractor is the injured party, these cases do not stand for the proposition that
every time an employee is injured the peculiar risk doctrine is inapplicable." 79 Cal. App. 3d
at 769, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
191. 79 Cal. App. 3d at 766, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (quoting Snyder v. Southern Cal. Edison
Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 801, 285 P.2d 912, 916 (1955)).
192. Id. at 772-73, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 251-55. The general contractor argued that it could
not be held liable for safety order violations because it was not a statutory employer. The
court found that it had a nondelegable duty under the contract terms. Id. The general con-
tractor also contended that the plaintiff's employer was not a "subcontractor" under the con-
tract definition because the work was conducted off the rapid transit subway site. Because the
subcontractor was to install the girders on the rapid transit work site, the court held it was a
subcontractor for purposes of the contract. Id. at 771-72, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
The argument that the plaintiff's employer was not a subcontractor because the work was
not conducted on the defendant's premises also failed in White v. Uniroyal, Inc., 131 Cal. App.
3d 1, 202 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1984). There, the court of appeal held that it was error not to give a
jury instruction on peculiar risk when, during the manufacture at a chemical plant of a com-
pound ordered by the defendant, three employees were injured and one killed. Id. at 31, 202
Cal. Rptr. at 159.
193. 24 Cal. 3d 502, 595 P.2d 619, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1979).
194. Id. at 507, 595 P.2d at 621, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
195. Id. at 508, 595 P.2d at 621, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 43. No precautions were provided for in
the contract for the demolition work. In fact, the plaintiff was assisting his foreman in pushing
on the panel, neither realizing that the bulldozer was involved in the same effort outside the
building. Id. at 507-08, 595 P.2d at 621, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 43. The court stated: "Certainly
the risk that someone may be hurt if precautions are not taken to assure that no one is standing
behind a wall that is being knocked over is a 'special, recognizable danger arising out of'
demolition work." Id. at 510, 595 P.2d at 623, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
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knocked off a ten-foot wall, which had no railings, by a concrete
buggy;196 a worker fell onto a steel floor from a thirty-foot steel column,
where no scaffolding, safety nets, lines or ladders were provided; 197 and a
cement finisher fell from a thirty-foot wet cement bridge which had no
rails or scaffolds.198 Conversely, collateral negligence was held to be the
cause of the forty-foot fall of a window washer in Salinero v. Pon. 19 9 Col-
lateral negligence was also found when two men working on a platform
fell after one worker sawed through the supports before a skip-loader was
in place to support the platform. 2" In the latter two cases, courts held
that injuries occurred because of the workers' negligence, rather than
from a failure to properly provide a safe work method.20 1
a. scaffolds
The Restatement cites scaffold accidents as an example of inherent
danger in the "ordinary or prescribed way of doing" work.2"2 The recog-
nizable risk in using a scaffold to paint a wall above a sidewalk is that the
scaffold, paint brush or bucket, or the painter himself, may fall and injure
someone passing below.203 Under Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp.,24 a
worker injured in a fall from a scaffold is also protected by the inherent
danger rule.2 °5 Moreover, one of the earliest California Supreme Court
cases to discuss peculiar risk with reference to workers involved a fall
from a scaffold.
20 6
Certain California courts have relied on the 1952 appellate decision
in Hard v. Hollywood Turf Club20 7 in holding that work with scaffolds is
196. Morehouse v. Taubman Co., 5 Cal. App. 3d 548, 85 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1970).
197. Stilson v. Moulton-Niguel Water Dist., 21 Cal. App. 3d 928, 98 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1971).
198. Fonseca v. County of Orange, 28 Cal. App. 3d 361, 104 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1972).
199. 124 Cal. App. 3d 120, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1981); see supra notes 169-72 and accompa-
nying text.
200. Elder v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 650, 136 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1977); see
infra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of collateral negligence.
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 comment c (1965).
203. Id. This particular comment contemplates injury to persons other than falling work-
ers. It is based on the facts of Jacob Doll & Sons v. Ribetti, 203 F. 593, 596 (3d Cir. 1913). In
Jacob Doll, a pedestrian was injured when a window washer lost his balance and fell from a
fourth story window sill. The defendant lessee was held liable since he knew that the building
was not equipped with hooks for safety belts and failed to provide for safety precautions in the
contract. Id. at 594-95.
204. Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp., 57 Cal. 2d 407, 369 P.2d 708, 20 Cal. Rptr. 12
(1962); see supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
205. Id. at 410-11, 369 P.2d at 711, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 15; see supra note 123.
206. Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaffolds, 57 Cal. 2d 651, 371 P.2d 311, 21 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1962); see supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
207. 112 Cal. App. 2d 263, 246 P.2d 716 (1952).
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not a peculiar risk.2 °8 In Hard, a painter fell forty feet to the ground
when a defective scaffolding erected by his subcontractor-employer col-
lapsed. Relying on the importance of the workers' compensation stat-
ute,219 the court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the defendant
general contractor retained control over the job site21" or that the general
contractor was a "statutory employer."2"' Finally, the court declared,
"[t]here is nothing inherently dangerous in doing work on a high scaf-
fold."'2 12 The court cited as authority the 1915 supreme court decision in
Schmidlin v. Alta Planing Co.,213 which held that there was nothing in-
herently dangerous in raising an otherwise empty scaffold that contained
a bucket of paint.2 14 In that case, the unsecured bucket fell and struck a
worker as painters standing on a roof lifted the scaffolding. However, the
court's decision in Schmidlin is distinguishable from Hard, because the
falling bucket in the Schmidlin case resulted from collateral negligence,
not from a failure to take precautions in the plan of work itself.
215
Despite the tenuous nature of this authority, courts critical of the
peculiar risk doctrine have cited Hard as support for the position that
"scaffolds" are not a peculiar risk. In Anderson v. Chancellor Western
Oil Development Corp.,2 "6 an oil worker was struck by a 150 to 200
pound "stabbing board. '217 Oil drilling crew members positioned the
stabbing boards at various heights on oil derricks for use as scaffolds.
The board that struck the plaintiff was dislodged by a catline used to
move part of the drilling floor. The court found that there was no pecu-
liar risk in the use of the stabbing board, citing Hard.218 The court found
that the combined use of the stabbing board and catline caused the plain-
208. See, e.g., Elder v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 650, 136 Cal. Rptr. 203
(1977); Anderson v. Chancellor W. Oil Dev. Corp., 53 Cal. App. 3d 235, 125 Cal. Rptr. 641
(1975). In Mackey v. Campbell Constr. Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 774, 785, 162 Cal. Rptr. 64, 69
(1980), the court of appeal stated that this attempted characterization is incorrect in that the
determination is factual, not legal. See supra note 32.
209. See supra note 1.
210. 112 Cal. App. 2d 263, 273-74, 246 P.2d 716, 723 (1952).
211. Id. at 268-72, 246 P.2d at 720-22.
212. Id. at 275, 246 P.2d at 724.
213. 170 Cal. 589, 150 P. 983 (1915).
214. Id. at 592, 150 P. at 984.
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426 (1965); see supra notes 163-72 for a
discussion of collateral negligence.
216. 53 Cal. App. 3d 235, 125 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1975).
217. Id. at 238, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 642. "Stabbing boards" are described as planks approxi-
mately 20 feet long, 12 inches wide and 3 inches thick, reinforced with iron edges and weighing
150 to 200 pounds. Id. at 238, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
218. Id. at 243, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 645 (citing Hard, 112 Cal. App. 2d at 275, 246 P.2d at
724).
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tiff's injuries.2 19 It held that, for policy reasons, the doctrine must be
strictly construed.22 ° On an oil well site, peculiar risks would be "explo-
sion, fire or disturbance of ground support where specific precautions are
required.
221
b. work in trenches
Work in trenches illustrates a peculiar risk of harm without the col-
lateral negligence issue of contractor-supplied equipment. Also, there is
usually the additional duty of care imposed on the landowner for activi-
ties on his land.222 Thus, liability has been found much more readily
than in the scaffold cases.
Injuries resulting from trench cave-ins are severe.223 Shoring, slop-
ing or other means are required to make trenches safe places to work.
224
California courts have held that trench work entails a peculiar risk re-
quiring these special precautions.225 In Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc.,226
a worker entered a nine-foot trench to check the grade, not realizing that
he could do so from outside the trench. The California Supreme Court
held that the work constituted a peculiar risk,227 even though it noted
that ordinarily no one would have entered the trench until a later stage in
219. 53 Cal. App. 3d at 243, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
220. Id. See supra note 38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy reasons
behind workers' compensation.
221. 53 Cal. App. 3d at 243, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422 (1965).
223. Evidence offered in Widman v. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc., 19 Cal. App. 3d 734, 97
Cal. Rptr. 52 (1971) reflected that, according to a 1964-65 study by the California Division of
Industrial Safety, 1 out of every 13 workers receiving a disabling injury in a cave-in dies, and
14 times as many workers die from cave-ins of ditches, trenches and other excavation work
than in any other construction accidents. Id. at 746, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
224. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, R. 1541(d) (1982).
225. See Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc., 23 Cal. 3d 578, 591 P.2d 503, 153 Cal. Rptr. 213
(1979), see infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text; Widman v. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc.,
19 Cal. App. 3d 734, 97 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1971); Delgado v. W.C. Garcia & Assocs., 212 Cal.
App. 2d 5, 27 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1963).
In Delgado, the defendants contracted with the City of San Jose to build a sewer for a
subdivision they owned. The court found that the contract with the City made the defendants'
duties nondelegable. Other possible bases of liability cited by the court were peculiar risk and
the nondelegable duty of landowners to invitees. 212 Cal. App. 2d at 9-10, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
616-17.
In Widman, a rain-soaked trench collapsed under the weight of a backhoe, burying two
workers. The court found considerable danger to the workers in the absence of shoring. 19
Cal. App. 3d at 746, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 59. The court also found substantial evidence that the
defendants exercised control over the job. Id. at 748, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
226. 23 Cal. 3d 582, 591 P.2d 503, 153 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1979).
227. Id. at 587, 591 P.2d at 508, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
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the work, at which time it would have been shored.2 28
4. Negligent work plan
The Restatement states that an owner-employer is liable for di-
recting that work be conducted in a negligent manner.229 The result of
imposing peculiar risk liability is to enlarge the scope of duty of an
owner-employer who actively participates in planning a job.
In Mackey v. Campbell Construction Co.,23° unsafe movement of an
unwieldy scaffold was found to be a peculiar risk. The owner-employer
purposely retained a high degree of control over its management contrac-
tor, Campbell Construction.23 1 Representatives of the owner-employer
and Campbell met with the subcontractor and agreed on a plan to move
a huge scaffold.232 The plan called for moving it into place fully assem-
bled. While being moved down a grade, the scaffold fell over, injuring
the plaintiff. The court held that the work method chosen was itself a
peculiar risk which required special precautions, such as removal of the
top sections.2 33
The Restatement defines a peculiar risk as one which an owner-em-
ployer should recognize as "likely to arise in... the particular method
which the owner-employer knows that the contractor will adopt. '2 34 In
Mackey, the defendant's participation in approving a method to move the
scaffold subjected it to an nondelegable duty. The peculiar risk ordina-
rily would arise only in the project itself-erection of aluminum siding at
a height of forty feet. If the method for moving the scaffold into place
had not been known and approved by the defendant, the injuries to the
plaintiff would have been found the result of negligence collateral to the
peculiar risk.235
228. Id. at 582, 591 P.2d at 505, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
229. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 410 (1965).
230. 101 Cal. App. 3d 774, 162 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1980).
231. Id. at 779-80, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 65. The defendant owner-employer hired Campbell
Construction to act as a management, rather than a general, contractor to construct a ware-
house. This arrangement was made so that the owner-employer could work through its own
personnel with Campbell to select subcontractors and participate directly in the project. Id.
232. Id. at 780, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 66. Sections of the scaffold were assembled so that it
measured over 30 feet high, 20 feet long and 5 feet wide with a 6 foot wheel base. Id. at 781,
162 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
233. Id. at 785-87, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 69-70 (citing Gettemy v. Star House Movers, 225 Cal.
App. 2d 636, 37 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1964)). In Gettemy, a worker was killed when a nine-ton tree
fell on him when it was unsafely cut down. The court held that the method chosen to fell the
tree in a residential district failed to employ proper precautions. 225 Cal. App. 2d at 644, 37
Cal. Rptr. at 446.
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 comment e (1965).
235. Id.
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An owner-employer will not ordinarily retain the degree of control
shown in Mackey. Where the owner-employer delegates responsibility to
a general contractor for planning a work method, the owner-employer
cannot be found liable for defects in the work plan. However, the general
contractor may be held liable for devising a plan that constitutes a pecu-
liar risk. In Caudel v. East Bay Municipal Utility District,2 36 a worker
slipped off the muddy push arm of his bulldozer while working at night.
The contractor provided lights for part of the project, but not for the area
to which the plaintiff was directed. The court held that whether the
work involved a peculiar risk in the absence of special precautions, i.e.,
failure of the general contractor to provide adequate lighting for work in
the muddy area, was a factual question. The defendant general contrac-
tor unsuccessfully argued that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from negli-
gence in the operative detail of the work-in the negligent orders of the
subcontractor to the plaintiff to move his bulldozer to an unlighted area
and to dismount.23 7
IV. LIMITATIONS TO THE PECULIAR RISK DOCTRINE
A. Workers' Compensation
Even though Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp.2 38 and other Califor-
nia Supreme Court opinions have not held that the workers' compensa-
tion system is a bar to third party recovery, some lower courts have
attempted to narrow the application of the peculiar risk rule, characteriz-
ing tort recovery by employees of subcontractors as a "windfall. ' 239 Per-
haps the strongest statement limiting the applicability of the doctrine
appeared in Anderson v. Chancellor Western Oil Development Corp.240 In
the Anderson court's view, the peculiar risk doctrine must be strictly in-
terpreted "where the strong public and legal policy favors exclusivity of
the workmen's compensation remedy." 241' The court noted that nondele-
gable duties have been found in "inherently dangerous" activities "gener-
ally in connection with some primary basis of liability. ' 242 While several
236. 165 Cal. App. 3d 1, 211 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1985).
237. Id. at 7, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
238. 57 Cal. 2d 407, 367 P.2d 708, 20 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1962); see supra notes 120-24 & 203-05
and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 37.
240. 53 Cal. App. 3d 235, 125 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1975).
241. Id. at 243, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
242. Id. at 239-40, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43. In Anderson, the plaintiff was struck by a
platform dislodged by a catline while he was working on an oil drilling floor. In addition to
finding that there was no peculiar risk because there was no "primary basis of liability," id. at
239, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 642, the court noted that the injury resulted from defective equipment
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bases for imposing a nondelegable duty may be present in a given situa-
tion, the peculiar risk doctrine does not require this. Subsequent deci-
sions by the court of appeal indicate a continuing split in accepting the
supreme court's policy permitting third party tort recovery.
243
B. Effect of Evolution to Comparative Negligence
1. Former law: contributory negligence and assumption of risk
Before the 1975 decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,244 which intro-
duced comparative negligence in California, workers could be barred
from recovery because of contributory negligence. However, in Fonseca
v. County of Orange,245 the court of appeal limited the applicability of
contributory negligence as a defense "in deference to . . . enlightened
policy factors underlying safety orders."246 In Fonseca, an experienced
cement finisher worked on a wet cement bridge despite knowing that re-
quired railings and scaffoldings were absent.247
In tort cases, another bar to recovery is the assumption of risk doc-
trine, under which plaintiffs may not recover if they voluntarily incurred
a known peril.248 However, assumption of risk is not a defense to suits
against owner-employers because "'public policy insists that the plain-
tiff's acquiescence or knowledge should not insulate the defendant from
liability for his violation.' "249 Whether a worker's conduct entailed con-
tributory negligence or assumption of the risk was normally an issue for
supplied by the independent contractor. Id. at 241, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 643 (citing McDonald v.
Shell Oil Co., 44 Cal. 2d 785, 285 P.2d 902 (1955)). See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying
text for a discussion of defective equipment as an exception to the peculiar risk rule.
243. See, e.g., Castro v. State, 114 Cal. App. 3d 503, 170 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1981), where the
court of appeal stated:
[A]s a matter of public policy, we see no justification for a strict interpretation of the
peculiar risk doctrine just because the injured person is the employee of the in-
dependent contractor rather than a third person. The workers' compensation law
preserves an employee's right to obtain redress for injuries caused by the negligence
of third persons who are not in an employment relationship with him. . . . The
Supreme Court has never suggested that the doctrine must be strictly interpreted
when the injured party is an employee of the independent contractor.
Id. at 514, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 740-41 (citation omitted).
244. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
245. 28 Cal. App. 3d 361, 104 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1972).
246. Id. at 370, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
247. Railings were required by safety orders under CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, art. 16, R.R.
1321, 1620 (1979). See supra notes 145-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
custom and practice of the construction industry as it relates to employer-owners foreseeability
of inherent risks.
248. Fonseca, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 368-69, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
249. Id. at 368, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 570 (quoting Mason v. Case, 220 Cal. App. 2d 170, 177,
33 Cal. Rptr. 710, 714 (1963)). Contributory negligence remained an available defense in both
Fonseca and Mason. Id. at 367, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
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the trier of fact. However, the court of appeal in Fonseca held that "the
policy of the safety statutes and safety orders is to protect workmen
whose unequal economic power prevents them from protecting them-
selves. This policy would be negated by a finding that behavior such as
that of plaintiff... was unreasonable."25
2. Modem law: comparative negligence
Under the Fonseca reasoning, a worker could recover fully for his
injuries, even where his negligence contributed to their occurrence.
Under comparative negligence, a worker's tort award should be reduced
by his proportionate negligence,25 ' but not for the negligence of the sub-
contractor-employer.252 However, in Elder v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co.,253 where the plaintiff's actions "bordered on the fool-
hardy,' 254 he and a co-plaintiff were denied recovery completely.
In Elder, construction of a building addition required removal of a
fire escape. A plan was devised to cut away the supporting rebar, using a
skip-loader under the platform during the last stage. Before the skip-
loader was in place, the plaintiff cut through the last rebar, sending the
platform, the plaintiff and a co-worker to the ground.255 The court held
that the plaintiff could not recover since he had not established a prima
facie case of negligence by the defendant owner-employer nor proved
proximate causation.256 The court's holding prevented the plaintiff from
presenting to the jury the issue of how much negligence was directly at-
tributable to the worker. The court held that where the negligence proxi-
mately causing injury is intimately connected with the special
precautions the owner-employer must undertake, the defendant is not
250. Id. at 369-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
251. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242-43, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
874-75 (1975).
252. Under Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961), a sub-
contractor-employer's workers' compensation lien is disallowed if he was contributorily negli-
gent. Following the supreme court's decision in Li, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975), however, the supreme court held in Associated Constr. & Eng'g Co. v.
Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978),
that principles of comparative negligence would be applied to reduce workers' compensation
liens by the percentage of fault attributed to the worker's employer. See, e.g., Kramer v. Cedu
Fdn., 93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979) (comparative negligence principles applied
against an employee and his employer); see infra text accompanying notes 258-59.
253. 66 Cal. App. 3d 650, 136 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1977).
254. Id. at 660, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
255. Id. at 656, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 205. Plaintiff Elder erroneously thought the channel iron
surrounding the platform would support the workers. The injured co-worker was also a
plaintiff.




In Kramer v. Cedu Foundation, Inc.,258 an intoxicated worker fell
from a twelve-foot scaffold while unsupervised on a Saturday morning,
and won an award based on negligent supervision.259 The jury appor-
tioned the negligence that caused the accident among the worker, his
immediate employer, the project supervisor and the owner-employer for
negligent supervision.260
V. PROPOSED APPROACH TO PECULIAR RISK PROBLEMS
Peculiar risk work involves neither ordinary negligence, for which
no owner-employer liability will be imposed, nor strict liability, where
liability without fault may be found. After an accident occurs, courts
inquire into whether it resulted from mere ordinary negligence or from a
peculiar risk situation.
A peculiar risk situation may exist even if the work is not highly
dangerous, and in fact is ordinary to construction. Although this makes
the factual determination more difficult, construction activities can be
classified according to the qualities that make them a peculiar risk.
The first issue is whether injury resulted from ordinary negligence in
the details of performing work. This category of negligence cannot fairly
be imputed to the owner-employer of an independent contractor. Acci-
dents involving hand tools will normally fall into this category.
Next, it must be decided whether the owner-employer should have
recognized in advance that, because of the nature of a particular activity,
injury might result unless safety measures were provided. This involves a
preliminary determination of whether a particular owner-employer has
*the sophistication to realize the dangers in the work ordered. However,
commercial owner-employers of independent contractors virtually al-
ways will meet this requirement. California cases which have held activi-
ties to require special precautions can be classified as those which involve
257. Id. at 659, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 207. The court commented: "[Tihe risk which was in fact
realized was not one inherent in the nature of the specific demolition project. Rather, the
injuries which befell plaintiffs ... were essentially the result of Elder's own negligence in
'sawing off the limb' upon which they both were standing." Id.
258. 93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979).
259. Id. at 12, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
260. Id. at 6, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 554. Cedu Foundation contracted for the construction of a
private residence. The general contractor shared supervisory responsibility with two Cedu
Foundation employees. Thejury assessed 38% negligence to Cedu and 24% negligence to the
general contractor, with 19% negligence assessed against both the employee and his immediate
supervisor. Id.
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the risk that workers will be injured by great weight or force, particularly
where they must work at heights, depths or near moving equipment.
The adequacy of safety precautions must next be decided. Precau-
tions can be as simple as preventing workers from venturing near danger-
ous work. Generally, the California Industrial Safety Orders with which
owner-employers must comply represent a fair standard by which to
measure whether proper precautions have been arranged. The safety or-
ders themselves are properly inadmissible as evidence, since otherwise
every aspect of construction site activity covered by safety orders could
be alleged to be "peculiar risk." However, where an activity otherwise
meets the peculiar risk description, the substance of the safety orders-
customs and practice-fairly presents the standard to which owner-em-
ployers should be held.
The harshness of the nondelegable duty and vicarious liability is
mitigated by the availability to owner-employers of indemnity from their
independent contractors, as well as comparative negligence against the
workers. As a condition to the contract, owner-employers normally in-
clude indemnity requirements. If at trial the owner-employer shows that
the worker's subcontractor-employer negligently failed to take precau-
tions, or that the employee himself was negligent, the owner-employer's
damages will be reduced. Thus, a jury award against an owner-employer
may be apportioned between the general contractor, subcontractor and
the employee, with the owner-employer liable for only a small amount.
While this may seem a circuitous route, placing tort liability back on the
employee's own subcontractor-employer, it is one that requires each
party, including the worker, to consider job safety and the precautions
required to prevent injuries.
VI. CONCLUSION
The peculiar risk doctrine represents a limited exception to owner-
employer nonliability and exclusivity of workers' compensation recovery
for injured workers. The doctrine permits a fair distribution of risk in
those circumstances that warrant its application, without circumventing
the principles of owner-employer nonliability or workers' compensation.
Landowners who contract for development of construction projects nec-
essarily recognize that the risks involved exceed the risks of nearly all
other industries. Under the enterprise theory, it has long been advocated
that those who order work from which they will benefit should bear the
risks attendant to it. The judicial decisions in California with respect to
assumption of risk, contributory negligence and comparative negligence
1532
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demonstrate a policy to place a lesser burden on an injured worker than
on the party who initiates the work resulting in the injury.
California's workers' compensation statutes also recognize that in
prescribed situations, recovery beyond the normal limits of the system is
equitable, as where a "serious and willful" disregard of the employee's
safety is shown.
Properly applied, the peculiar risk doctrine operates with the work-
ers' compensation and owner-employer nonliability principles to achieve
equitable distribution of risk in a dangerous industry.
Kathleen M. MeKenna
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